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Kremlin-Backed Forgery Scheme Moved $6.9 Billion Through Global Banks

Standard Chartered, Citigroup, and other international banks served as conduits for more than $6.9 billion in payments tied to a Kremlin-backed fintech operation that relied on industrial-scale document forgery to bypass western sanctions. …

Kremlin-Backed Forgery Scheme Moved $6.9 Billion Through Global Banks

Standard Chartered, Citigroup, and other international banks served as conduits for more than $6.9 billion in payments tied to a Kremlin-backed fintech operation that relied on industrial-scale document forgery to bypass western sanctions. The scheme, run through the company A7, used hundreds of front companies and counterfeit invoices to access the Swift messaging system, according to a large leak of internal files. The payments included transactions related to military equipment and purchases by Russian security services, underscoring the direct national security implications of the operation.

A7 was established in Russia and Kyrgyzstan by Ilan Shor, a Moldovan oligarch, with backing from Promsvyazbank, a Russian state-owned lender closely tied to the defence industry. The group was designed as an alternative to the western payments system after Russian banks were cut off from Swift following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. While A7 publicly promoted itself as a sanctions-proof financial innovator, the leaked documents show it depended on a network of existing businesses and shell entities to move money through the global banking system. The forgery operation produced fake invoices that obscured the true origin and purpose of the payments, allowing A7 to present them as legitimate commercial transactions.

The scale of the operation is substantial. Accounts held at Standard Chartered in Hong Kong alone received $1.1 billion from A7-linked entities between late 2024 and August 2025. DBS in Hong Kong received $273 million, and Citigroup clients were sent $74 million over the same period. Clients of Deutsche Bank in Europe received about $18 million. In the United Arab Emirates, A7 opened accounts at First Abu Dhabi for 17 different entities, which together made more than $1.8 billion in outbound payments. The company also held accounts at JPMorgan Chase and DBS. Chinese bank accounts were the final destination for just over half of the total flows.

The leak reveals at least 100 front companies that made payments during the period covered, with documents mentioning more than 100 additional groups across the UAE, Hong Kong, Kyrgyzstan, Indonesia, the UK, and Hungary. The largest single paying entity was a now-closed Kyrgyz state body, the Trading Company of the Kyrgyz Republic. One entity in Hungary appears to have served as the critical conduit for payments into the European Union.

The operation highlights a persistent weakness in the global financial system: the difficulty of keeping sanctioned actors out when they can recruit legitimate businesses and create shell structures that move money through multiple jurisdictions. A former US government banking analyst who studied a previous leak from A7 said the new data shows the true scale of the money-laundering network is far larger than previously understood. The material, he said, should prompt a reassessment of how hard it is to insulate the international banking system from such schemes.

The episode also carries a geopolitical dimension. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi discussed a Russian-Indian payment system this month, with A7 featured prominently at the Brics summit in New Delhi. The Kremlin has positioned A7 as a flagship solution for cross-border payments, and the leak suggests that western banks, despite sanctions, remain vulnerable to penetration by carefully constructed laundering networks.

For compliance officers and policymakers, the lesson is that document-based controls have limits. The forgeries were not sophisticated cyberattacks but old-fashioned counterfeits, produced in volume and routed through shell companies in low-oversight jurisdictions. Closing these gaps will require more than better screening at individual banks; it will demand coordinated action across regulators, correspondent banks, and the jurisdictions where such front companies are registered. Until then, the A7 case stands as a reminder that the global payments system, for all its technological advances, still rests on trust in paper documents that can be forged at scale.

Source & Credits

Originally reported by Financial Times.

Written for Il Progresso by Xiaoyu Zhao.

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